Editing Organizations and their effectiveness-2016/Key concept definitions
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Our collective homework for Tuesday, July 5... | Our collective homework for Tuesday, July 5... | ||
== Culture == | == Culture == | ||
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As mentioned last week, I would distinguish between an external culture that might seep into an organization versus an organizational culture that might arise or be built within an organization. See the Martinez et al. (2015) short essay in AER P&P from the readings for my second session for more on this distinction. On the former, in addition to the Hofstede (1980) and Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen (2012) papers mentioned last week and cited in Martinez et al., there is also Ichino and Maggi (QJE 2000) about absenteeism by Northern and Southern Italians who move between northern and southern branches of a large Italian bank. On the latter, Schein (1985) is a key reference and gives a definition of organizational culture quoted in Martinez et al., and I would offer the unpublished paper mentioned last week by the Martinez team plus additional co-authors as first-differenced evidence: analyzing ICUs in Michigan in 2004 and again in 2006, the bloodstream-infection rate fell the most in ICUs where the nurses' answer improved the most to the statement "I frequently have trouble expressing disagreement with staff physicians in this ICU." | As mentioned last week, I would distinguish between an external culture that might seep into an organization versus an organizational culture that might arise or be built within an organization. See the Martinez et al. (2015) short essay in AER P&P from the readings for my second session for more on this distinction. On the former, in addition to the Hofstede (1980) and Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen (2012) papers mentioned last week and cited in Martinez et al., there is also Ichino and Maggi (QJE 2000) about absenteeism by Northern and Southern Italians who move between northern and southern branches of a large Italian bank. On the latter, Schein (1985) is a key reference and gives a definition of organizational culture quoted in Martinez et al., and I would offer the unpublished paper mentioned last week by the Martinez team plus additional co-authors as first-differenced evidence: analyzing ICUs in Michigan in 2004 and again in 2006, the bloodstream-infection rate fell the most in ICUs where the nurses' answer improved the most to the statement "I frequently have trouble expressing disagreement with staff physicians in this ICU." | ||
== Network == | == Network == | ||
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- All of Dan Carpenter's readings?? | - All of Dan Carpenter's readings?? | ||
=== Mara === | === Mara === | ||
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Power is the #1 obsession in IR, so it's difficult to formulate a one-sentence definition. But roughly, I think the various understanding of power can be distilled along two dimensions. | Power is the #1 obsession in IR, so it's difficult to formulate a one-sentence definition. But roughly, I think the various understanding of power can be distilled along two dimensions. | ||
1) "Materialist/Agentic": in the sense that power is something agents possess and exert | 1) "Materialist/Agentic": in the sense that power is something agents possess and exert, having “power over” | ||
*The most famous example here is Dahl’s (1957) definition: power is “power is the ability of A to get B to do something he or she would otherwise not do” | *The most famous example here is Dahl’s (1957) definition: power is “power is the ability of A to get B to do something he or she would otherwise not do” | ||
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To address some of these limitations, we can bring in a second dimension of power | To address some of these limitations, we can bring in a second dimension of power | ||
2) "Relational/Constitutive": power is something that creates agents and defines them in relation to one another | 2) "Relational/Constitutive": power is something that creates agents and defines them in relation to one another about having “power to”. | ||
*The best summary here is Barnett & Duvall (2005), who develop a 2x2 typology: | *The best summary here is Barnett & Duvall (2005), who develop a 2x2 typology: | ||
[[File:barnett&duvall2005.png]] | [[File:barnett&duvall2005.png]] | ||
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== Utility == | == Utility == | ||
=== Romain === | === Romain === | ||
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== Tastes == | == Tastes == | ||
=== Manuel === | === Manuel === | ||
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So I guess I have moved from needing one definition to needing another: if you and I are playing a two-move game and I play "trust" in my first move (and it is common knowledge that the game is definitely over after your second move, and that we will never see each other again, and that you will never interact with third parties who knowhow you played in our game), is it the same thing to say (a) that I am trusting you and (b) that I have a view about your "type" that leads me to predict how you will act after I play "trust"? | So I guess I have moved from needing one definition to needing another: if you and I are playing a two-move game and I play "trust" in my first move (and it is common knowledge that the game is definitely over after your second move, and that we will never see each other again, and that you will never interact with third parties who knowhow you played in our game), is it the same thing to say (a) that I am trusting you and (b) that I have a view about your "type" that leads me to predict how you will act after I play "trust"? | ||
== Rationalization == | == Rationalization == | ||
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For readings, see Bendix 1956, in a masterful mid-20th century assessment of managerial ideologies, he describes the bureaucratization of management clearly: “The increasing size of industrial enterprises entails certain administrative problems which in each case require for their solution the addition of salaried personnel.” (p. 226) His analysis captures a secular change in the American industry by which entrepreneurs and heirs are replaced by better-educated bureaucrats. | For readings, see Bendix 1956, in a masterful mid-20th century assessment of managerial ideologies, he describes the bureaucratization of management clearly: “The increasing size of industrial enterprises entails certain administrative problems which in each case require for their solution the addition of salaried personnel.” (p. 226) His analysis captures a secular change in the American industry by which entrepreneurs and heirs are replaced by better-educated bureaucrats. | ||
For the U.S. nonprofit sector, see Hwang and Powell, ''ASQ'', 2009, where we show the adoption of strategic planning, external audits, and efficiency metrics related to admin. costs. Christof and i currently are working on a paper showing how and why the contents of rationalization change over time. | For the U.S. nonprofit sector, see Hwang and Powell, ''ASQ'', 2009, where we show the adoption of strategic planning, external audits, and efficiency metrics related to admin. costs. Christof and i currently are working on a paper showing how and why the contents of rationalization change over time. | ||
== Legitimacy == | == Legitimacy == | ||
=== | === Mara === | ||
IR scholars fight volumes of battles over this one too. Rather than try to give an overview, I focus on Thomas Franck’s (1988) piece. Franck is an international lawyer and I think this definition has some interesting implications for our discussions of formal and relations contracts. | |||
Franck defines legitimacy as “the quality of a rule which derives from a perception on the part of | |||
those to whom the rule is addressed that it has come into being in accordance with the right process”. He identifies four indicators of legitimacy: | |||
*”Determinacy”= clarity, letting people/states know exactly what is expected of them. The more determinant a rule, the more difficult to resist compliance and to justify non-compliance & the less room for “flexible” interpretation | *”Determinacy”= clarity, letting people/states know exactly what is expected of them. The more determinant a rule, the more difficult to resist compliance and to justify non-compliance & the less room for “flexible” interpretation | ||
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== Norms == | == Norms == | ||
=== Mara === | === Mara === | ||
Norms are intersubjective standards defining socially-appropriate behavior for a given type of actor in a given situation. They can have regulative, constitutive, permissive, prescriptive & proscriptive effects. Norms don't guarantee that agents will behave in certain ways; they only make certain behaviors more or less likely. Relatedly, norms are "counterfactually valid", meaning that specific incidences of non-compliance doesn't invalidate the norms (i.e. rules can be honored in the breach). | Norms are intersubjective standards defining socially-appropriate behavior for a given type of actor in a given situation. They can have regulative, constitutive, permissive, prescriptive & proscriptive effects. Norms don't guarantee that agents will behave in certain ways; they only make certain behaviors more or less likely. Relatedly, norms are "counterfactually valid", meaning that specific incidences of non-compliance doesn't invalidate the norms (i.e. rules can be honored in the breach). | ||
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=== Bob === | === Bob === | ||
Can a repeated-game equilibrium be a norm? If so, are all norms such equilibria? How does this distinction relate to trust and socialization? | Can a repeated-game equilibrium be a norm? If so, are all norms such equilibria? How does this distinction relate to trust and socialization? | ||
== Functionalism == | == Functionalism == | ||
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* [[Media:Davis_asr_1945.pdf|Davis, Kingsley, and Wilbert E. Moore. "Some principles of stratification." American sociological review 10, no. 2 (1945): 242-249.]] | * [[Media:Davis_asr_1945.pdf|Davis, Kingsley, and Wilbert E. Moore. "Some principles of stratification." American sociological review 10, no. 2 (1945): 242-249.]] | ||
Functionalism, in sociology, is an analytical framework that describes the world as a stable, cohesive system, whose parts contribute to the stability of the overall system. More simply, things are the way they are because they work. (Structural) functionalism was a dominant school of thought in 1950s sociology. The framework's legitimacy was compromised by an intellectual dispute between Harvard-sociologist Talcott Parsons and some of his colleagues (such as CW Mills). Anti-functionalists considered the framework inherently conservative, which they considered to be at odds with observed conflict, turmoil, and oppression in the real world. Critics of functionalism invoke what Gould and Lewontin called the Panglossian Paradigm as an illustration for the naïve assumptions underlying the idea that social structures must be functional. Dr. Pangloss, a "court meta-physician" in Voltaire’s play Candide, gave the paradigm its name: | Functionalism, in sociology, is an analytical framework that describes the world as a stable, cohesive system, whose parts contribute to the stability of the overall system. More simply, things are the way they are because they work. (Structural) functionalism was a dominant school of thought in 1950s sociology. The framework's legitimacy was compromised by an intellectual dispute between Harvard-sociologist Talcott Parsons and some of his colleagues (such as CW Mills). Anti-functionalists considered the framework inherently conservative, which they considered to be at odds with observed conflict, turmoil, and oppression in the real world. Critics of functionalism invoke what Gould and Lewontin called the Panglossian Paradigm as an illustration for the naïve assumptions underlying the idea that social structures must be functional. Dr. Pangloss, a "court meta-physician" in Voltaire’s play Candide, gave the paradigm its name: | ||
''“It is demonstrable,” said [Dr. Pangloss], “that things cannot be otherwise than as they are; for as all things have been created for some end, they must necessarily be created for the best end. Observe, for instance, the nose is formed for spectacles, therefore we wear spectacles. The legs are visibly designed for stockings, accordingly we wear stockings. Stones were made to be hewn and to construct castles, therefore My Lord has a magnificent castle; for the greatest baron in the province ought to be the best lodged. Swine were intended to be eaten, therefore we eat pork all the year round: and they, who assert that everything is right, do not express themselves correctly; they should say that everything is best.”'' | ''“It is demonstrable,” said [Dr. Pangloss], “that things cannot be otherwise than as they are; for as all things have been created for some end, they must necessarily be created for the best end. Observe, for instance, the nose is formed for spectacles, therefore we wear spectacles. The legs are visibly designed for stockings, accordingly we wear stockings. Stones were made to be hewn and to construct castles, therefore My Lord has a magnificent castle; for the greatest baron in the province ought to be the best lodged. Swine were intended to be eaten, therefore we eat pork all the year round: and they, who assert that everything is right, do not express themselves correctly; they should say that everything is best.”'' | ||
There aren’t really any empirical studies of functionalism because it’s pretty much a non-falsifiable school of thought whose validity depends on what one considers “optimal” or “efficient." One eloquent critique of the functionalism of Transaction Cost Economics is Granovetter’s (1985) Economic Action and Social Structure, in which he challenges Williamson’s claim that “the organizational form observed in any situation is that which deals most efficiently with the cost of economics transactions”. Granovetter’s main concern is that selection pressures may be weak and efficient solutions may not be feasible, allowing for dysfunctional or second-best organizational designs. | There aren’t really any empirical studies of functionalism because it’s pretty much a non-falsifiable school of thought whose validity depends on what one considers “optimal” or “efficient." One eloquent critique of the functionalism of Transaction Cost Economics is Granovetter’s (1985) Economic Action and Social Structure, in which he challenges Williamson’s claim that “the organizational form observed in any situation is that which deals most efficiently with the cost of economics transactions”. Granovetter’s main concern is that selection pressures may be weak and efficient solutions may not be feasible, allowing for dysfunctional or second-best organizational designs. | ||
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I also defined voice from Hirschman. In keeping with Bo's efforts to craft "tweetable" definitions, mine is the following: | I also defined voice from Hirschman. In keeping with Bo's efforts to craft "tweetable" definitions, mine is the following: | ||
:: ''An attempt to maintain, improve, or repair relationships through communication (expression of dissent, frustration, agreement/support, commitment)'' | :: ''An attempt to maintain, improve, or repair relationships through communication (expression of dissent, frustration, agreement/support, commitment)'' | ||
== Contract == | == Contract == | ||
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I like the term '''accounts''' a lot. It has a discursive aspect, indeed, it has been used in a little literature on the sociology of talk (see Scott & Lyman, ASR, Feb. 1968). In this context, it refers to socially approved vocabularies, or statements made to bridge the gap between actions and expectations. P&P makes a great deal out of Renaissance account books, which detail social expectations quite clearly, and of course, double-entry bookkeeping is a topic that Padgett and Wargalien are writing about. ''Accounts are a linguistic or symbolic device employed when actions are subject to evaluative inquiries''. There is an obvious link to be built to Gibbons' use of the term stories. | I like the term '''accounts''' a lot. It has a discursive aspect, indeed, it has been used in a little literature on the sociology of talk (see Scott & Lyman, ASR, Feb. 1968). In this context, it refers to socially approved vocabularies, or statements made to bridge the gap between actions and expectations. P&P makes a great deal out of Renaissance account books, which detail social expectations quite clearly, and of course, double-entry bookkeeping is a topic that Padgett and Wargalien are writing about. ''Accounts are a linguistic or symbolic device employed when actions are subject to evaluative inquiries''. There is an obvious link to be built to Gibbons' use of the term stories. | ||
For an article on the evolution of the term "appropriate" in the context of academic entrepreneurship, see Colyvas and Powell, | For an article on the evolution of the term "appropriate" in the context of academic entrepreneurship, see Colyvas and Powell, 20006. | ||
Roads to Institutionalization: The Remaking of Boundaries Between Public and Private Science (PDF), ''Research in Organizational Behavior'', 21:305-53 (2006) Jeannette Colyvas, W.W. Powell. | Roads to Institutionalization: The Remaking of Boundaries Between Public and Private Science (PDF), ''Research in Organizational Behavior'', 21:305-53 (2006) Jeannette Colyvas, W.W. Powell. | ||
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Status, in macro-organizational sociology, is an organization’s position in the social structure. Organizations higher up in the status order have more social ties to other organizations, or more ties to well networked affiliates. It is easier for well-connected organizations to accumulate resources and perform highly, which leads to the self-reproduction of status. This process is commonly referred to as accumulative advantage or “Matthew Effect" (Chen et al. 2012, Sauder, Lynn, and Podolny 2012). High-status across can stay on top of the status order because they can produce cheaper and sell more expensively, as both suppliers and consumers use status information as a proxy for expected quality and reliability (Podolny 2005). Podolny’s (2005) book Status Signals is an authoritative account of how organizational status affect consumers, producers, and market competition. There is a largely separate literature on the status of individuals and groups inside organizations in social psychology. | Status, in macro-organizational sociology, is an organization’s position in the social structure. Organizations higher up in the status order have more social ties to other organizations, or more ties to well networked affiliates. It is easier for well-connected organizations to accumulate resources and perform highly, which leads to the self-reproduction of status. This process is commonly referred to as accumulative advantage or “Matthew Effect" (Chen et al. 2012, Sauder, Lynn, and Podolny 2012). High-status across can stay on top of the status order because they can produce cheaper and sell more expensively, as both suppliers and consumers use status information as a proxy for expected quality and reliability (Podolny 2005). Podolny’s (2005) book Status Signals is an authoritative account of how organizational status affect consumers, producers, and market competition. There is a largely separate literature on the status of individuals and groups inside organizations in social psychology. | ||