Editing Organizations and their Effectiveness (2016)

This is a page to collect resources, links, and supplementary information related to the [https://www-casbs.stanford.edu/local/workshops/2016-casbs-summer-institute-organizations-and-their-effectiveness/ 2016 Summer Institute on Organizations and their Effectiveness] held at the [http://casbs.stanford.edu Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences (CASBS)] at Stanford University. 

Please create an account (reload the page if it gives you a hard time), '''be bold''', and add/organize/discuss as you see fit. 

If you need help with wiki-markup or anything else, feel free to [mailto:aaronshaw@northwestern.edu email Aaron]. 

== Workshop Information ==

* The [https://www-casbs.stanford.edu/local/workshops/2016-casbs-summer-institute-organizations-and-their-effectiveness/ workshop website] has more detailed information about  (note that a login is required to access some resources).

Our esteemed leaders

[[File:bob.jpg]] [[File:woody.jpg]]

== Papers ==

=== Rules Versus Statutes and Type I versus Type II Incomplete Law ===

This is a random selection. More of the important ones coming.

* [[Media:Baier_sjms_1986.pdf|Baier, Vicki Eaton, James G. March, and Harald Saetren. "Implementation and ambiguity." Scandinavian Journal of Management Studies 2, no. 3 (1986): 197-212.]]
* [[Media:SSRN-id1160987.pdf|Pistor, Katharina, and Chenggang Xu. "Law enforcement under incomplete law: Theory and evidence from financial market regulation." LSE STICERD Research Paper No. TE442 (2002).]]
* [[Media:Funk_amr_2016.pdf|Funk, Russell, and Daniel Hirschman. "Beyond nonmarket strategy: market actions as corporate political activity." Academy of Management Review (2015): amr-2013.]]

=== Standards and Standard-Setting Organizations ===

* Bonatti and Rantakari (2016) on [https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20140316 Standard-Setting Organizations], ''The Politics of Compromise'' (from Bob)
* Timmermans and Epstein's (2010) [http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.soc.012809.102629 review article] on sociological research on standards: ''A World of Standards but not a Standard World''
* Ahrne and Brunsson's (2008) theory of [https://www.amazon.com/Meta-organizations-Goran-Ahrne/dp/1847209505 Meta-Organizations], an organization with organizations as members
* Bromley and Meyer's (2015) book on [https://global.oup.com/academic/product/hyper-organization-9780199689866?cc=us&lang=en& hyper-organization], and an [http://stx.sagepub.com/content/31/4/366.abstract article] (2013) that summarizes the main argument

== Definitions ==

=== Network === 

==== Romain ====

'''Definition:''' a network is a collection of nodes and a collection of ties among these nodes. 

Types of networks: Several common distinctions are often made when talking about networks. A network can be directed or undirected (tie from $i$ to $j \neq$ tie from $j$ to $i$), and weighted or unweighted. One can also consider static vs. dynamic networks (ties or nodes are created/disappear over time), or multiplex networks (there are several types of ties). 

When talking about networks, one should always define: (1) what type of network are we talking about, (2) what is a node, (3) what is a tie. Examples: friendship network [type = undirected, unweighted network, node = person, tie = $i$ and $j$ are friends], airport traffic [type = weighted, directed network, node = airport, tie = number of daily flights from airport $i$ to airport $j$]

'''(Theoretical) network models:''' Two broad distinctions: (1) network formation vs. process on a network, (2) non-strategic [no game theory] vs. strategic [game theory]. 

Examples: 

Non-strategic game of network formation: Barabassi and Albert's model of preferential attachment. Question: Why do networks often exhibit a hub and spoke structure [few nodes with many connections, many nodes with few connections]? Model: start with one node. At each time period, a new node is created and forms 1 tie with some old node selected at random. Old nodes with more connections are selected with higher probability. 

Strategic game of network formation: Matt Jackson's coauthor's model. Question: how does a population of scholars pick coauthors? Authors choose whether to form ties with other authors. Two authors with a tie are coauthors. Players' utility increases with the number of coauthors, but busy coauthors (ie coauthors with many connections) give less benefits less than non-busy coauthors. 

Non-strategic process on a network: probabilistic diffusion model. Some disease diffuses on a network. Question: which structures lead to a pandemic (everybody is infected), which do not? On a network, an initial node is infected (the seed). She infects her neighbors with some probability. At each time period, newly infected nodes infect their neighbors with some probability. 

Strategic process on a network: Chwe's model of social movements. Question: which network structures lead to a revolution (every node protests)? On a network, each node has a threshold. A node protests if the number of her neighbors who protest is above that threshold.

=== Utility === 

==== Romain ====

Real-valued function representing preferences over choices. That is, suppose there are many alternatives $x_1, ..., x_n$. Suppose I have well-defined preferences over those choices (that is, for each pair of choices, I can say which one I prefer). A utility function is a function over those choices is function such that if I prefer $x_i$ to $x_j$, then $u(x_i) \geq u(x_j)$. 

=== Rationality ===

==== Romain ====

I am rational when I select the choice that maximizes my utility.